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Abstract 
 
Our study of 602 European banks over 1996-2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into 
fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher 
income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. 
The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between 
bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks 
price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) 
hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.  
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1. Introduction 
With financial deregulation and the increase in disintermediation, European banks 
faced high competition in the 1990s. Commercial banks suffered from a sharp decline in 
interest margins and profitability on traditional intermediation activities. Banks reacted to this 
new environment by diversifying into new activities which considerably altered their income 
structure by reducing the importance of their traditional lines of business. For instance, for 
commercial banks, the share of non-interest income in total income increased from 26% to 
41% from 1989 to 1998 (ECB 2000). Banking industries in most western countries have 
experienced similar trends and in the case of the US the share of non-interest income has 
grown from 19% in the 1980s to 43% in 2001 (Stiroh, 2004). This new environment has 
several implications for the safety and supervision of the banking system. First, it is not clear 
whether by widening the range of products they supply banks improve their risk/return trade 
off and their default risk. Second, the provision of a larger set of products increases the 
incentives for cross-subsidisation which may distort risk exposure. Consequently, among 
others, U.S. regulators, such as Dingell (2002), have raised questions about the pricing of 
loans and specifically the lending risk premium, claiming that “commercial banks may be 
winning high service fees by underpricing credit facilities as a loss leader to their clients”.  
There is an extensive literature that questions the implications of this new environment 
on bank risk but to our knowledge there has been no attempt to explore the link between 
product expansion and the pricing of traditional activities such as loans. The literature 
dedicated to the expansion of banks’ activities beyond deposit taking and lending, either 
focuses on portfolio diversification effects (risk return profile) (Boyd et al., 1980; Kwan, 
1998; DeYoung and Roland, 2001) or on incentives approaches (Rajan, 1991; John et al., 
1994; Puri, 1996; Boyd et al., 1998). Mostly based on U.S. data, the aim of these studies is to 
assess the overall effect on risk and only a few papers are able to show that the combination 
of lending and non-interest income activities allows for diversification benefits and therefore 
risk reduction. Conversely, some papers find a significant positive impact of diversification 
on earnings volatility (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
Another strand of the literature which analyses the optimal behaviour of bank lending and 
interest margin setting (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972; Ho and Saunders 1981) has integrated risk 
determinants as explanatory factors (Angbazo, 1997; Wong, 1997). These studies show how 
factors such as credit risk and interest risk affect bank interest margins. Building on this 
literature, Carbó and Rodriguez (2007) have questioned the implications of the expansion of 
non-traditional intermediation activities on bank margins in a multi-output framework. 
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Extending the Ho and Saunders model, they show that the relationship between margins and 
market power is dependent on the extent of output diversification. Their results also show that 
income from non-traditional activities impacts on net interest margins, through possible cross-
subsidisation effects. However, they do not empirically analyse the link between loan pricing, 
risk pricing and diversification. 
 The aim of this paper is to revisit the bank interest margin literature to assess the 
impact on the lending rate of the expansion of financial intermediaries beyond traditional 
intermediation activities (deposit funded loans) and towards activities generating non-interest 
income. We use individual bank data from 1996 to 2002 for 602 European commercial and 
cooperative banks from 12 countries to estimate the determinants of loan rates and interest 
margins in a setting that accounts for the presence of non-interest activities such as 
commission and fee activities and trading activities. Our measure of expansion towards non-
traditional activities is the net income share of non-interest income which is also split into the 
share of trading income and the share of commission and fee income. In order to explore 
whether banks engaged in product diversification actually underprice loans, we specifically 
focus on the determinants of loan rates.  
 This paper extends the earlier work on bank diversification and on bank interest 
margin and loan rate setting in two directions. First, this is one of the first studies dedicated to 
the issue of diversification that examine the case of the European banking industry which 
experienced tremendous changes over the last decade
2
. Second, this is the first paper which 
empirically raises the issue of loan pricing implications of the trend towards product 
diversification by assuming potentials for cross-selling among traditional and non-traditional 
activities which could induce banks to lower lending rates and underprice credit risk.  
 The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents the specification of our 
econometric model of interest margins and the data we use. This section also shows how our 
work extends earlier studies. Section 3 presents the results of our investigation of cross-selling 
between lending and non-traditional activities. Section 4 concludes.  
                                                 
2
 Acharya, Hasan and Saunders (2002) have studied the case of Italian banks by looking at the degree of 
diversification of the loan portfolio. Their findings show that loan diversification is not guaranteed to produce a 
higher return and/or lower risk for banks. Another paper (Smith, Staikouras and Wood, 2003) which studies 
European banks focused on the correlation between non-interest income and interest income and their variability 
showing that the increasing importance of non-interest income stabilised profits in the banking industry during 
the period 1994-1998. In a more recent study based on a broad panel of European listed banks, Baele et al. 
(2006) find that banks with higher levels of non-interest income have higher expected returns but also higher 
systematic risk. Eventually, using a sample of European banks, Lepetit et al. (2007) show that the positive link 
between the income share of non-interest income and risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially 
driven by commission and fee activities. In their study, a higher share of trading activities is to some extent 
associated with lower asset and default risks for small banks.  
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2. Method, data and link with existing literature 
In this section we investigate the link between the pricing of loans (interest rate 
setting) and the shift towards non-interest activities raising the issue of potential cross-selling 
of loans and fee-based activities. Our aim is to examine whether banks might use some of 
their products, particularly their traditional lending activities as loss leaders. Banks are more 
likely to use loans for such a purpose because by establishing long-term relationships with 
their borrowers, they are able to extract surplus in the future (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). In 
this paper, we raise the issue of whether banks might draw benefit from non-traditional 
activities under such an approach.  
Therefore, our hypothesis is that banks may charge lower rates on their lending 
activities, underpricing credit risk which may in turn increase their overall risk level. 
Consequently, the price banks charge for loans should be a decreasing function of non-interest 
income and, particularly, commission and fee income. Specifically, granting a (long term) 
loan increases the probability of actually selling fee generating products to a core customer 
while the prospects of gaining from other non-traditional activities, such as trading activities, 
remain unchanged. Therefore, we investigate the determinants of the lending rate by 
distinguishing commission and fee income and trading income. We expect loan prices to be 
linked with commission and fee income but not with trading income.  
 
2.1. Definition of variables 
 We explore this issue by focusing on the determinants of the lending risk premium, i.e. 
the lending rate charged by the bank minus the risk free interest rate, using several definitions. 
Alternatively, we also consider the default spread that is the difference between the rate on a 
risky loan and the rate on a zero-default bond of equivalent maturity.  
We use two measures as proxies for the risk premium or the default spread. 
W_SPREAD is the difference between the ratio of net interest income to total earning assets 
and either the three-month or the ten-year government bond rate. N_SPREAD is the lending 
rate (determined as the ratio of interest from loans to net loans) minus either the three-month 
or the ten-year government bond rate
3
. For consistency with previous studies, we also 
consider the broader issue of bank interest margins with two measures of the net interest 
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 Our results are not affected by the choice of a given maturity for the government bond. We focus on the ten-
year rate by assuming that the average maturity (duration) of loans is close to ten years. Nevertheless, we check 
for robustness using shorter maturities in our different estimations.  
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margin that are frequently used in the literature (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Angbazo, 1997; 
Wong, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). W_MARGIN is the ratio of net interest 
income (defined as interest income minus interest expense) to total earning assets. 
N_MARGIN is the ratio of interest from loans to net loans minus the ratio of interest expense 
to total liabilities (defined as total assets minus total equity). 
Considering the optimal bank interest margin literature (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972; Ho 
and Saunders, 1981; Angbazo, 1997; Wong, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Drakos, 
2003; Maudos and Guevara, 2004), we first select a set of variables which are used in most 
studies aiming to capture the determinants of bank loan pricing.  
Based on the theoretical model of Carbó and Rodriguez (2007), we also add product 
diversification variables as determinants of bank margins but while these authors focused on 
output diversification and market power in their empirical work our aim is to study the link 
between loan prices and the extent of income from other sources. In line with previous papers 
(see Stiroh (2004)), diversification of bank activities is proxied by several variables. NNII is 
the ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income. Net non-interest income is non-
interest income less non-interest expenses; net operating income is net interest income plus 
net non-interest income. Our product diversification measure is also disaggregated (DeYoung 
and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004), into commission and fee income and trading income. COM 
is the ratio of net commission and fee income to net operating income. TRAD is the ratio of 
net trading income to net operating income. Net commission income is equal to commission 
income minus commission expense and net trading income is equal to trading income minus 
trading expense. Alternatively, we also define a variable, COMSHA, which measures the 
proportion of net commission and fee income in net non-interest income. 
 
2.2. Sample 
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1996 to 2002 
for European commercial and cooperative banks in 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
(see Appendix, Table A.1). The bank data are from Bankscope
4
. Apart from small German 
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 Some countries such as Greece and Germany are omitted in our sample because banks do not report 
information on trading revenue and on the interest they receive from loans which we need to compute the 
implicit lending rates. For most countries we consider in our study, Bankscope provides information on the 
interest received from customer loans specifically. In the case of Belgium, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
we are able to consider the following items respectively: interest receivable and similar income (which excludes 
income from variable-yield securities), interest and discount income (which excludes interest and dividend 
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local cooperative banks (more than 1600 banks) that we deliberately ignore, Bankscope 
reported at the end of 2002 balance sheets and income statements for 2129 banks for the 
countries we consider. We delete 1333 banks with less than three consecutive years of time 
series observations
5
. To minimize the effects of measurement errors we have excluded all the 
outliers (194 banks) by eliminating the extreme bank/year observations (2.5% lowest values 
and 2.5% highest values) for each considered variable. We verified that the statistical 
properties of our clean sample of 602 banks and the initial sample of 2129 banks are similar 
by comparing the mean values of all our variables. Data on market interest rates come from 
Datastream International. Table 1 provides summary statistics. 
[Insert table 1 around here] 
 
2.3. Model specification 
Four models are defined for each dependent variable. As a first step (equations [1] and 
[5] in tables 2 and 3) we estimate the margin model and the spread model referring to a 
general specification often used in previous papers. For spread equations, the standard 
deviation of the three-month interbank rate (VR3M) measures uncertainty on the money 
market. Therefore, a higher risk premium should be required following a rise in interest rate 
volatility ( 2 > 0β ). When dealing with margin equations, we substitute the level of the three-
month interbank rate (R3M) for its volatility (VR3M): an increase in the level of the risk free 
rate implies a higher opportunity cost ( 2 0α > ). The ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans 
(LLP) is considered as a measure of borrowers default risk for both margin and spread 
equations. A higher premium should be charged by banks to offset higher credit risk 
( 3 3and > 0α β ). The ratio of equity to total assets (EQUITY) is introduced to account for the 
effect of leverage on risk levels and the required risk premium ( 5 4α and > 0β )6. The five-
bank asset concentration variable (CR5) is a proxy of market structure. Higher concentration 
is often associated with higher lending rates. Therefore, the expected sign of the coefficient is 
positive (α7 and β6 >0). Regarding personnel expenses (EXPENSES) the literature provides 
mixed results on the expected coefficient. Because screening and monitoring of borrowers 
                                                                                                                                                        
income on trading portfolios and financial investment) and interest received (which excludes interest received 
arising from debt securities and dividend income). 
5
 All the banks in our sample publish their annual financial statements at the end of the calendar year. 
6
 In the bank interest margin literature this variable has been introduced, under the dealership approach 
developed by Ho and Saunders (1981), as a proxy of the degree of bank risk aversion (McShane and Sharpe, 
1985; Maudos and Guevara, 2004; Angbazo, 1997). Alternatively, in the expected utility approach of Wong 
(1997), the ratio of equity to total assets is considered to take into account the effect of capital regulation on 
margins.  
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require higher personnel costs, the default risk premium charged on loans can be lower (α6 
and β5 < 0). Conversely, as the cost of granting loans increases with personnel expenses banks 
should charge a higher premium (α6 and β5 > 0). We also consider liquidity risk for margin 
equations measured as the ratio of net loans to deposits (LIQUIDITY). As the ratio increases, 
liquidity risk increases implying a higher margin set by banks ( 4 > 0α ). 
[Insert tables 2 and 3 around here] 
 
2.4. Hypotheses  
By augmenting several specifications of the standard model with diversification 
variables (see tables 2 and 3, equations [2] to [4] for margin setting and equations [6] to [8] 
for spread determinants) our aim is to capture loan pricing implications of the degree of bank 
diversification and to check for the robustness of results. In Carbó and Rodriguez (2007) 
product diversification affects margins either positively or negatively depending on their other 
determinants. We investigate this issue by looking at the link between margins (or loan 
prices) and our product diversification measures. As discussed above, if banks actually use 
loans to establish long term relationships with customers (Peterson and Rajan, 1995) enabling 
them to potentially increase income from non-interest activities, or use non-interest activities 
to attract new borrowers, we would expect a negative coefficient for the variable NNII which 
measures product diversification (α8 and β7 < 0) and for COMSHA, COM and TRAD which 
are proxies of the structure of diversification (α9, α10, α11, β8, β9 and β10 < 0).   
Hypothesis 1: Banks more engaged in non-interest activities set a different margin 
and/or charge a different lending rate than less diversified banks.  
Loss leader hypothesis 1’: If banks use loans to attract new customers and to establish 
long term relationships the link between margins (or spreads) and output diversification 
should be negative. Banks would presumably set a lower interest margin and/or charge a 
lower lending rate if they expect to increase their income from non-interest activities and 
particularly from commission and fee activities. Alternatively, when gaining higher income 
from non-interest activities banks can set lower prices on loans to attract new customers. 
 
To further investigate the issue of potential cross-selling between loans and fee-based 
activities we also test the extent to which credit risk affects loan interest rates. For this 
purpose, we estimate augmented models which capture the interaction of non-interest 
generating activities and default risk (see tables 4 and 5, equations [9] to [11] and equations 
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[12] to [14]). Interaction variables measure the impact of non-interest generating activities on 
the borrower’s default risk component of the lending rate and the interest margin (α12, α13, α14, α15, β11, β12, β13 and β14 < 0). A negative coefficient implies that for a given level of 
borrower default risk, banks charge a lower default risk premium when they are more 
diversified
7
.  
Hypothesis 2: Banks with more non-interest activities, particularly in commission and 
fee activities, underprice credit risk. 
 
Interaction terms may not be the most accurate method to capture cross subsidy effects 
and specially distortion effects in credit risk pricing. Banks may actually charge a lower loan 
rate but collect higher fees from the same borrower to offset a higher exposure to default risk. 
In that case loan loss provisions based on earned interest no longer serve as a buffer against 
borrower default but banks can rely on other non-interest income to control their risk 
exposure. Nevertheless, if commission and fees are charged at an identical flat rate, that is if 
the same conditions apply for any customer, or if fees are not risk dependent, credit risk 
would be mispriced at the individual borrower level. A deeper investigation requires the use 
of individual borrower data to assess default risk, lending conditions and the price set for 
services (commission and fees) for each individual customer or for different categories of 
clientele.  
[Insert tables 4 and 5 around here] 
 
3.  Results and robustness checks  
3.1. Results 
 Tables 2 and 3 show the results which are obtained with two-way fixed effect panel 
data estimations (individual and time fixed effects). Fisher tests are used to determine if our 
data require the utilization of panel estimation or pooled estimation techniques. Heterogeneity 
across units leads us to use panel data estimations. Most panel data models are estimated 
under either fixed-effects or random-effects assumptions. We perform a Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) to choose between these two basic models which leads us to use a fixed 
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 A negative coefficient of the interaction variable implies that a more diversified bank will charge a lower risk 
premium than a less diversified bank but this lower risk premium need not be negative. The credit risk premium 
can be computed by considering the coefficient of the credit risk variable and the coefficient of the interaction 
variable multiplied by the bank’s level of diversification. If the coefficient of the interactive variable is 
significantly negative the required risk premium becomes lower as diversification increases.  
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effect model (within estimator). We deal for possible heteroskedasticity by using the White 
methodology when estimating the equations.  
On the whole, the coefficients of the standard variables considered in the literature are 
significant and have the expected sign. The credit risk proxy (LLP) is significant and positive 
in each regression. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that banks charge higher 
lending rates for riskier loans. 
The net non-interest income variable (NNII) introduced in equations [2] and [6] has a 
significant negative coefficient in all our panel data estimations suggesting possible cross-
selling of traditional lending activities and non-interest generating activities.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we consider as a first step non-traditional income 
activities at a disaggregated level. We split these activities into fee-based income and trading 
income. Equations [4] and [8] in tables 2 and 3 show that the coefficient of COM (the income 
share of commission and fee income) is negative and significant. Thus, up to this stage our 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks decrease their lending rate when they are 
more reliant on fee income
8
. Conversely the coefficient of the variable indicating the extent to 
which bank revenue is trading based (TRAD) is not significant except when the dependent 
variable is the margin from all interest generating activities (W_MARGIN) comprising loans 
but also other market assets such as securities. Therefore, our findings do not indicate any 
correlation between loan prices (N_MARGIN and N_SPREAD) and the relative importance 
of income generated by trading activities.  
As a second step, because our results suggest that banks might be cross-selling their 
products using loans as a loss leader and possibly underpricing credit risk, we test whether 
risk pricing varies with fee income share. We explore this issue by estimating the augmented 
models in which interaction variables are introduced to capture the presence of such a 
behaviour via a negative impact on the dependent variable (equations 9 to 14 in tables 4 and 
5). Hence, the interaction variables stand for the mixed effect on risk pricing via the interest 
rate spread (risk premium) banks require on their loans. In this sense, banks may decrease 
their lending rate to attract or to retain borrowers which are potential customers for fee 
                                                 
8
 To further investigate the relationship between product diversification and margins (or loan prices) we perform 
exogeneity tests. When N_MARGIN and N_SPREAD are the dependent variables, we cannot reject H0 (no 
correlation between our diversification variable(s) and the error term) which suggests the absence of recursive 
causality between the dependent variable and the diversification variables. In other words, there is some 
evidence that non-interest income impacts on margins and not the reverse. When W_MARGIN and W_SPREAD 
are the dependent variables, our exogeneity tests reject H0. However, this result does not necessarily imply the 
presence of recursive causality between the diversification variables and the dependent variables. For instance, 
H0 could be rejected because of an omitted variable correlated with the diversification variable(s)). 
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generating products. But their exposure to default risk may consequently become higher. In 
our study this effect is captured by a fall in the spread (risk premium) that is not consistent 
with the level of credit risk. The interaction variables are defined as the credit risk variable 
(LLP) multiplied by each of the non-interest income variables (NNII, COMSHA, COM and 
TRAD). Whereas almost all the interaction variables are significant and negative in the 
margin equations (when the dependent variable is W_MARGIN or N_MARGIN, table 4) 
only the variables involving commission and fee income are significant in the spread 
equations (W_SPREAD or N_SPREAD, table 5). This means that for higher levels of 
commission and fee shares (COM), which are always positive by construction, a higher 
exposure to credit risk (LLP) has a lower effect on the interest rate spread (measured by the 
sum of the coefficients of LLP (positive) and LLP*COM (negative) which are highly 
significant in table 5)
9
. Hence, according to our results the non-interest income subsidy effect 
distorts credit risk pricing for banks expanding commission and fee activities but the 
development of trading activities does not significantly affect the link between credit risk and 
the pricing of loans. As discussed above (section 2.4), our results are based on the assumption 
that banks do not charge higher fees to borrowers with higher default risk. A deeper insight on 
this issue requires detailed data on individual borrower’s default risk, lending conditions and 
fees paid for banking services.  
 
3.2. Robustness checks and further issues 
10
 
Several robustness checks are performed. First, we deal with possible trend issues 
(decrease in interest margins due to higher competition and higher proportion of non-interest 
generating activities at the end of the sample period) by running cross-section estimations for 
each year instead of introducing time fixed effects. Second, we run our estimations by 
introducing a time trend instead of a fixed time effect in our panel data models and for further 
checks by first differencing the variables. Overall, the main conclusions remain valid. 
We also perform a number of robustness checks that are specification related. First, we 
include country dummies to capture the presence of country specific effects. Second, to 
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 To assess the overall effect of credit risk on the dependent variable, one needs to consider not only the 
coefficient of LLP but also the coefficients of the interaction variables (LLP×NNII, LLP×COMSHA, LLP×COM 
or LLP×TRAD). More precisely, if we consider equation 12’ in Table 5, the impact of credit risk on the 
dependent variable for a given bank which exhibits, for a given year, a value of NNII equal to 40%, is equal to 
the coefficient of LLP + (the coefficient of (LLP×NNII) × the value of NNII taken by the bank): 0.636 + (- 0.644 × 0.4) that is a value equal to 0.378. In this case credit risk is not fully taken into account in the loan rate setting 
process (a coefficient of 0.378 instead of a coefficient of 0.636 without the cross-selling effect).  
10
 The results from the estimations conducted in this section are available from the authors on request. 
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control for macroeconomic conditions, we introduce each country’s growth of GDP in our 
estimations. Third, when calculating the spread, we use the three-month interbank rate 
(instead of the ten-year government bond rate). Fourth, we run the regressions by using two 
other proxies of market structure, the three-bank asset concentration and the Herfindhal index 
(instead of the five-bank asset concentration). Fifth, we introduce in our estimations the ratio 
of total operating expense to operating income as an alternative to the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets. Sixth, other control variables such as the ratio of loans to total assets 
and the ratio of deposits to total assets are also included in the regressions. Our conclusions 
regarding the inclusion of product diversification variables remain unchanged. 
To check for sample representativeness, we estimate all the equations using a larger 
sample which is not restricted to three consecutive years of available information for each 
bank (6535 observations instead of 4048 for W_MARGIN and W_SPREAD, 3859 
observations instead of 2342 for N_MARGIN and N_SPREAD). To examine the accuracy of 
our results, regressions for W_MARGIN and W_SPREAD are also carried out on a sample 
constrained by the availability of the data to compute N_MARGIN and N_SPREAD with an 
identical number of observations (2342) for all the equations. Our conclusions are unaltered. 
Eventually, to further examine issues related to size and diversification we carry out a 
deeper investigation of our sample.  
Our sample comprises large and small banks with different types of operations and 
clienteles and therefore our results need to be further checked by considering size effects. 
Because they might be serving larger borrowers with lower default risk large banks exhibit, in 
our sample, a lower lending rate on average. Again, in our sample, large banks are also 
slightly more diversified (higher share of non-interest income) than small banks. Moreover, 
non-interest income stems from various activities which are more innovation driven for large 
banking corporations but to a large extent linked to traditional activities for small local banks.  
We therefore conduct the estimations separately for large banks (total assets > 1 billion Euros) 
and small banks (total assets < 1 billion Euros). Our results show that small and large banks 
do not behave differently and that our findings are not biased by the fact that larger banks 
which exhibit lower lending rates are on average more diversified than small banks. 
We also check whether the level of diversification might possibly influence bank’s 
strategies and therefore our results. At this end, we differentiate banks with relatively high 
and relatively low shares of commission and fee income (ratio of net commission income to 
net operating income, COM, higher than the third quartile Q75 and COM lower than the first 
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quartile Q25). We then run the estimations separately for the two sub-samples of banks based 
on this criterion. Results are mainly the same for the two types of banks.  
In addition, we also consider as a sub-sample banks for which loan activities represent 
a significant share of their balance sheet (i.e. at least twenty percent of banks’ total assets). 
Under this restriction it is assumed that to engage in cross-selling banks must have first 
developed loan activities to a certain extent. All conclusions concerning the variables of 
interest remain unchanged. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 The objective of this study was to analyze the implications of the trend towards 
stronger product diversification in the European banking industry. In addition to risk related 
issues addressed in previous papers we test for a possible cross-selling behaviour of interest 
and non-interest products by analysing the determinants of the risk premium charged by 
banks on their loans. Specifically, we find that higher reliance on fee-based activities is 
associated with lower lending rates and that borrower default risk is underpriced in the 
lending rates charged by banks with higher fee-income shares. Therefore, our findings suggest 
that banks may use loans as a loss leader raising the issue of how cross-selling strategies 
should be addressed by regulators to control for bank risk. In this sense our results may 
explain the positive relationship between risk and bank product diversification found in some 
studies (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Baele et al. 
2006; Lepetit et al. 2007). Conversely, we do not find a link between lending rates and the 
growing share of trading activities in bank income statements.  
Our conclusions are based on the assumption that banks do not charge higher fees 
when lending to riskier borrowers and that on average higher income from commission and 
fee activities does not serve as a buffer against default risk along with traditional instruments 
such as loan loss provisions. A deeper investigation on this issue requires access to more 
detailed data on the default risk and lending conditions of individual borrowers but also on 
individual prices for banking services. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that, for more 
diversified banks, there is a weaker link between provisions for expected loan losses (as 
measured by loan loss provisions) and expected loan losses. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for European commercial and cooperative banks (average over 1996-2002) 
 
 LOANS DEP EQUITY LLP EXPENSES ROA ROE W_MARGIN N_MARGIN W_SPREAD N_SPREAD NII NNII COM TRAD TA 
 Mean  60.64  52.18  8.77  0.67  1.62  0.79  9.30  2.79  0.93  1.40  1.40  65.51  34.48  27.00  6.03  18546 
 Max  95.93  91.89  53.42  9.28  21.48  16.08  68.99  10.42  18.18  16.16  25.83  100  99.96  96.77  78.35  745000 
 Min  5.69  0.75  0.42 -2.02  0.07 -14.87 -175.77  0 -23.42 -4.15 -5.35  0.03  0 -18.31 -70.80  17 
 Std  17.45  16.06  5.82  0.72  1.11  1.00  10.13  1.20  4.58  1.72  3.06  18.94  18.94  15.77  8.69  69238 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentage except TA which is in millions of euros): LOANS = loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY = equity/total 
assets; LLP = loan loss provisions/net loans; EXPENSES = personnel expenses/total assets; ROA = return on average assets; ROE = return on average equity; W_MARGIN = net interest 
income/total earning assets; N_MARGIN = interest income from loans/net loans – interest expenses/total liabilities; W_SPREAD = net interest income/total earning assets - the ten-year 
government bond rate; N_SPREAD = interest from loans/net loans - the ten-year government bond rate; NII = net interest income/net operating income; NNII = net non-interest income/ 
net operating income; COM = net commission income/net operating income; TRAD = net trading  income/net operating income; TA : total assets in millions of euros. 
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Table 2. Two way fixed effect regression (LSDV): impact of product diversification on net interest margin for European banks (1996-2002) 
it 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 j(i)t it
MARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY + α EXPENSES + α CR5 ε+  [1] or [1’] 
it 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 8 it itj(i)tMARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY + α EXPENSES + α CR5 α NNII + ε+  [2] or [2’] 
it 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 8 it 9 it itj(i)tMARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY + α EXPENSES + α CR5 α NNII α COMSHA + ε+ +  [3] or [3’] 
it 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 10 it 11 it itj(i)tMARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY + α EXPENSES + α CR5 α COM α TRAD + ε+ +  [4] or [4’] 
 
Equation R3M 
(+) 
LLP 
(+) 
LIQUIDITY 
(+) 
EQUITY 
(+) 
EXPENSES 
(+/-) 
CR5 
(+) 
NNII 
(-) 
COMSHA 
(-) 
COM 
(-) 
TRAD 
(-) 
R
2 
                Dependent variable: W_MARGIN (4048 obs.) 
[1] 0.140*** 
(5.814) 
0.004** 
(2.343) 
0.004 
(1.537) 
0.048*** 
(4.432) 
0.332*** 
(8.218) 
0.010* 
(1.898) 
- - - - 0.94 
[2] 0.139*** 
(6.118) 
0.002*** 
(3.178) 
0.004** 
(2.207) 
0.041*** 
(3.887) 
0.364*** 
(8.866) 
0.013** 
(2.260) 
-0.013*** 
(-4.670) 
- - - 0.94 
[3] 0.141*** 
(6.203) 
0.003** 
(2.219) 
0.003** 
(1.994) 
0.042*** 
(4.118) 
0.368*** 
(9.001) 
0.013** 
(2.303) 
-0.013*** 
(-4.536) 
-0.002 
(-0.282) 
- - 0.94 
[4] 0.119*** 
(4.369) 
0.004** 
(2.224) 
0.003* 
(1.667) 
0.039*** 
(3.907) 
0.385*** 
(9.227) 
0.013** 
(2.255) 
- - -0.022*** 
(-5.668) 
-0.018*** 
(-8.581) 
0.95 
                Dependent variable: N_MARGIN (2342 obs.) 
[1’] 0.248*** 
(2.813) 
0.005** 
(2.046) 
-0.055*** 
(-8.130) 
-0.108* 
(-1.861) 
0.280 
(0.958) 
0.015 
(0.555) 
- - - - 0.91 
[2’] 0.249*** 
(2.804) 
0.021** 
(2.210) 
-0.054*** 
(-7.820) 
-0.111* 
(-1.783) 
0.299 
(0.997) 
0.015 
(0.619) 
-0.005*** 
(-2.531) 
- - - 0.91 
[3’] 0.249*** 
(2.801) 
0.020** 
(2.198) 
-0.054*** 
(-7.774) 
-0.111* 
(-1.786) 
0.298 
(0.995) 
0.015 
(0.607) 
-0.005*** 
(-2.563) 
-0.016 
(-0.876) 
  0.91 
[4’] 0.254*** 
(2.747) 
0.007*** 
(3.065) 
-0.055*** 
(-8.004) 
-0.111* 
(-1.898) 
0.295 
(0.973) 
0.017 
(0.652) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.003*** 
(-2.253) 
-0.012 
(-1.060) 
0.91 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions: W_MARGIN = net interest income/total earning assets; N_MARGIN = (interest from loans/net loans) – interest expenses/total liabiities; LIQUIDITYit = 
net loans/deposits; CR5 jt = five-bank asset concentration for country j; R3Mjt = the three-month interbank rate for country j; LLPit = loan loss provisions/net loans for bank i 
at time t; EQUITYit = equity/total assets for bank i at time t; EXPENSESit = personnel expenses/total assets for bank i at time t; NNIIit = net non-interest income/ total net 
operating income for bank i at time t; COMit = net commission and fee income/ total net operating income for bank i at time t; TRADit = net trading income/ total net 
operating income for bank i at  time t; COMSHAit = net commission and fee income/ net non-interest income. 
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Table 3. Two way fixed effect regression (LSDV): impact of product diversification on risk premium for European banks (1996-2002) 
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 εβ β β β β β +  [5] or [5’] 
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt 7 it it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 NNII + εβ β β β β β + β  [6] or [6’] 
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt 7 it 8 it it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 NNII COMSHA + εβ β β β β β + β + β  [7] or [7’] 
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt 9 it 10 it it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 COM TRAD + εβ β β β β β + β + β  [8] or [8’] 
 
Equation VR3M 
(+) 
LLP 
(+) 
EQUITY 
(+) 
EXPENSES 
(+/-) 
CR5 
(+) 
NNII 
(-) 
COMSHA 
(-) 
COM 
(-) 
TRAD 
(-) 
R2 
                        Dependent variable: W_SPREAD (4048 obs.) 
[5] 0.549*** 
(4.141) 
0.426*** 
(5.821) 
-0.018* 
(-1.675) 
0.125** 
(2.017) 
-0.002 
(-0.716) 
- - - - 0.51 
[6] 0.343** 
(2.611) 
0.443*** 
(6.315) 
-0.025** 
(-2.383) 
0.347*** 
(5.175) 
0.004 
(1.531) 
-0.021*** 
(-8.317) 
- - - 0.51 
[7] 0.340** 
(2.582) 
0.442*** 
(6.315) 
-0.025** 
(-2.363) 
0.350*** 
(5.211) 
0.004* 
(1.672) 
-0.022*** 
(-8.301) 
-0.083 
(-1.061) 
- - 0.51 
[8] 0.257* 
(1.865) 
0.440*** 
(6.350) 
-0.014 
(-1.217) 
0.317*** 
(2.846) 
0.003 
(1.330) 
- - -0.034*** 
(-9.149) 
0.002 
(0.635) 
0.51 
                        Dependent variable: N_SPREAD (2342 obs.) 
[5’] 1.379*** 
(6.995) 
0.730*** 
(7.383) 
0.090*** 
(9.005) 
0.207** 
(2.515) 
0.054*** 
(15.333) 
- - - - 0.20 
[6’] 1.391*** 
(6.967) 
0.732*** 
(7.228) 
0.088*** 
(8.700) 
0.204** 
(2.128) 
0.053*** 
(16.324) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.957) 
- - - 0.21 
[7’] 1.397*** 
(7.000) 
0.723*** 
(7.154) 
0.087*** 
(8.626) 
0.209** 
(2.164) 
0.054*** 
(16.394) 
-0.005*** 
(-2.966) 
-0.166*** 
(-3.010) 
- - 0.21 
[8’] 1.344*** 
(6.542) 
0.727*** 
(6.889) 
0.093*** 
(8.668) 
0.175* 
(1.888) 
0.054*** 
(15.940) 
- - -0.001** 
(-2.205) 
0.030 
(0.528) 
0.21 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions: W_SPREAD = the ratio of net interest income to total earning assets - the ten-year government bond rate; N_SPREAD = lending rate determined as the 
ratio of interest from loans to net loans - the ten-year government bond rate; CR5 jt = five-bank asset concentration for country j; VR3Mjt = volatility of the  three-month 
interbank rate (standard deviation computed with daily data) for country j; LLPit = loan loss provisions/net loans for bank i at time t; EQUITYit = equity/total assets for bank 
i at time t; EXPENSESit = personnel expenses/total assets for bank i at time t; NNIIit = net non-interest income/ total net operating income for bank i at time t; COMit = net 
commission and fee income/ total net operating income for bank i at time t; TRADit = net trading income/ total net operating income for bank i at  time t; COMSHAit = net 
commission and fee income/ net non-interest income. 
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Table 4. Two way fixed effect regression (LSDV): impact of interaction variables (product diversification*credit risk) on net interest margin for 
European banks (1996-2002) ( )
it 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 j(i)t 12 it it it
MARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY + α EXPENSES + α CR5 α LLP NNII /100+ ε+ ×  [9] or [9’] ( ) ( )
6 it 7 j(i)tit 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 12 it it 13 it it it
+ α EXPENSES + α CR5MARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY α LLP NNII /100 α LLP COMSHA /100+ ε+ × + ×  [10] or [10’] ( ) ( )
6 it 7 j(i)tit 1i 2 j(i)t 3 it 4 it 5 it 14 it it 15 it it it
+ α EXPENSES + α CR5MARGIN = α + α R3M + α LLP + α LIQUIDITY + α EQUITY α LLP COM /100 α LLP TRAD /100+ ε+ × + ×   [11] or [11’] 
 
 R3M 
(+) 
LLP 
(+) 
LIQUIDITY 
(+) 
EQUITY 
(+) 
EXPENSES 
(+/-) 
CR5 
(+) 
LLP* NNII 
/100 
(-) 
LLP*COMSHA 
/100 
(-) 
LLP*COM 
/100 
(-) 
LLP*TRAD 
/100 
(-) 
R
2 
                Dependent variable: W_MARGIN (4048 obs.) 
[9] 0.129*** 
(4.999) 
0.116*** 
(2.758) 
0.004* 
(1.901) 
0.050*** 
(4.614) 
0.331*** 
(8.697) 
0.007 
(1.312) 
-0.210** 
(-2.554) 
- - - 0.94 
[10] 0.130*** 
(5.037) 
0.117** 
(2.560) 
0.004* 
(1.772) 
0.050*** 
(4.777) 
0.334*** 
(8.933) 
0.007 
(1.356) 
-0.211** 
(-2.548) 
-0.013 
(-0.018) 
- - 0.94 
[11] 0.127*** 
(5.004) 
0.136*** 
(3.438) 
0.004* 
(1.662) 
0.050*** 
(4.608) 
0.333*** 
(8.562) 
0.007 
(1.368) 
- - -0.209** 
(-2.384) 
-0.317*** 
(-5.040) 
0.94 
                Dependent variable: N_MARGIN (2342 obs.) 
[9’] 0.232*** 
(2.832) 
0.403*** 
(3.614) 
-0.053*** 
(-8.436) 
-0.100* 
(-1.695) 
0.256 
(0.884) 
0.010 
(1.366) 
-0.709*** 
(-6.429) 
- - - 0.91 
[10’] 0.232*** 
(2.841) 
0.457*** 
(4.199) 
-0.053*** 
(-8.349) 
-0.100* 
(-1.691) 
0.252 
(0.876) 
0.010 
(0.359) 
-0.737*** 
(-5.870) 
-4.029 
(-0.868) 
- - 0.91 
[11’] 0.232*** 
(2.789) 
0.318*** 
(3.723) 
-0.054*** 
(-8.332) 
-0.102* 
(-1.744) 
0.259 
(0.909) 
0.011 
(0.438) 
- - -0.544*** 
(-3.401) 
-0.558 
(-1.145) 
0?91 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions: W_MARGIN = net interest income/total earning assets; N_MARGIN = (interest from loans/net loans) – interest expenses/total liabiities; LIQUIDITYit = 
net loans/deposits; CR5jt = five-bank asset concentration for country j; R3Mjt = the three-month interbank rate for country j; LLPit = loan loss provisions/net loans for bank i 
at time t; EQUITYit = equity/total assets for bank i at time t; EXPENSESit = personnel expenses/total assets for bank i at time t; LLPit*NNIIit = LLP*(net non-interest income/ 
total net operating income)  for bank i at time t; LLPit*COMit = LLP*(net commission and fee income/ total net operating income)  for bank i at time t; LLPit*TRADit = LLP*( 
net trading income/ total net operating income)  for bank i at  time t; LLPit*COMSHAit = LLP*(net commission and fee income/ net non-interest income). All the variables are 
expressed in %. Therefore, the interaction variables are divided by 100 to obtain coefficients that can be directly compared to the coefficient of LLP.  
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Table 5. Two way fixed effect regression (LSDV): impact of interaction variables (product diversification*credit risk) on risk premium for 
European banks (1996-2002) ( )
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt 11 it it it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 LLP NNII /100+ εβ β β β β β + β ×  [12] or [12’] ( ) ( )
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt 11 it it 12 it it it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 LLP NNII /100 LLP COMSHA /100+ εβ β β β β β + β × + β ×  [13] or [13’] ( ) ( )
it 1i 2 jt 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 jt 13 it it 14 it it it
SPREAD = + VR3M + LLP + EQUITY + EXPENSES + CR5 LLP COM /100 LLP TRAD /100+ εβ β β β β β + β × + β ×  [14] or [14’] 
 
 VR3M 
(+) 
LLP 
(+) 
EQUITY 
(+) 
EXPENSES 
(+/-) 
CR5 
(+) 
NNII*LLP/100 
(-) 
LLP*COMSHA/100 
(-) 
LLP*COM*/100 
(-) 
LLP*TRAD/100 
(-) 
R2 
                        Dependent variable: W_SPREAD (4048 obs.) 
[12] 0.460*** 
(3.407) 
0.914*** 
(4.796) 
-0.021** 
(-2.070) 
0.211*** 
(3.653) 
0.002 
(0.736) 
-1.111*** 
(-3.463) 
- - - 0.57 
[13] 0.459*** 
(3.392) 
0.934*** 
(4.598) 
-0.022** 
(-2.066) 
0.211*** 
(3.646) 
0.002 
(0.785) 
-1.116*** 
(-3.435) 
-2.156 
(-0.227) 
- - 0.57 
[14] 0.378*** 
(2.823) 
0.620*** 
(8.626) 
-0.015 
(-1.409) 
0.181** 
(2.624) 
0.003 
(1.451) 
- - -2.166*** 
(-8.647) 
-0.121 
(-0.248) 
0.57 
                        Dependent variable: N_SPREAD (2342 obs.) 
[12’] 1.346*** 
(6.768) 
0.636*** 
(6.555) 
0.089*** 
(8.294) 
0.241** 
(2.586) 
0.056*** 
(15.801) 
-0.644* 
(-1.952) 
- - - 0.22 
[13’] 1.349*** 
(6.767) 
0.692*** 
(6.891) 
0.088*** 
(8.830) 
0.243** 
(2.604) 
0.056*** 
(15.814) 
-0.599*** 
(-2.827) 
-11.166* 
(-1.746) 
- - 0.22 
[14’] 1.324*** 
(6.509) 
0.620*** 
(8.702) 
0.095*** 
(9.010) 
0.202** 
(2.261) 
0.057*** 
(15.943) 
- - -1.007*** 
(-2.814) 
-0.004 
(-0.009) 
0.22 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions: W_SPREAD = the ratio of net interest income to total earning assets - the ten-year government bond rate; N_SPREAD = lending rate determined as the 
ratio of interest from loans to net loans - the ten-year government bond rate; CR5 jt = five-bank asset concentration for country j; VR3Mjt = volatility of the  three-month 
interbank rate (standard deviation computed with daily data) for country j; LLPit = loan loss provisions/net loans for bank i at time t; EQUITYit = equity/total assets for bank 
i at time t; EXPENSESit = personnel expenses/total assets for bank i at time t; LLPit*NNIIit = LLP*(net non-interest income/ total net operating income)  for bank i at time t; 
LLPit*COMit = LLP*(net commission and fee income/ total net operating income)  for bank i at time t; LLPit*TRADit = LLP*( net trading income/ total net operating income)  
for bank i at  time t; LLPit*COMSHAit = LLP*(net commission and fee income/ net non-interest income). All the variables are expressed in %. Therefore, the interaction 
variables are divided by 100 to obtain coefficients that can be directly compared to the coefficient of LLP.  
. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Distribution of banks by country 
 Numbers of  banks 
Austria 3 
Belgium 17 
Denmark 42 
France 149 
Italy 152 
Netherlands 24 
Norway 15 
Portugal 16 
Spain 15 
Sweden 6 
Switzerland 106 
United Kingdom 57 
Total 602 
 
